Kim Jong-Il's Death -- More Articles from Joo Seong-Ha

Here is a summary of a few more articles by Mr. Joo Seong-Ha, published since yesterday's post.

Ten Real Concerns by Ordinary North Koreans
[권력승계 시기-방식엔 관심없는 北주민들… 그들이 진짜 신경쓰는 10가지] (Dec. 26, 2011)

Joo notes that ordinary North Koreans could not care less about when and how Kim Jong-Un succeeded the throne, because they know that their lives will not change. Joo then notes ten points about which North Koreans truly care.

1. What do you call Kim Jong-Un?  Kim Il-Sung was called "Chairman" [수령님], and Kim Jong-Il was called "General" [장군님]. Kim Jong-Un is still being called "Comprade" [동지], but that will almost certainly change going forward.

2. What do you call Kim Jong-Un's sayings?  Kim Il-Sung's sayings are called "lessons" [교시]. Kim Jong-Il's sayings are called "remarks" [말씀]. Both "lessons" and "remarks" have to be quoted extensively when North Koreans speak in public. There is no directive as to what Kim Jong-Un's sayings will be called.

3. When will the badge with Kim Jong-Un's face come out?

4. Will there be another round of forced labor?  After Kim Il-Sung passed, North Korea built thousands of "Towers of Eternal Life" [영생탑] to commemorate Kim Il-Sung by extorting people's money and labor. There may be another round of this, because the officials would hardly miss a chance to extort money in the process.

5. Will there be a special ration on January 8, known to be Kim Jong-Un's birthday?

6. How will Kim Jong-Il's statues be placed?  Currently, statues of Kim Il-Sung are placed at the center of every city. Would Kim Jong-Il's statue be placed next to those statues? Will they face the Kim Il-Sung statues, or will they stand side-by-side?

7. Will there be a "revolution study lab" for Kim Jong-Un also?  At every school, corporation and factor in North Korea, three rooms are dedicated as "revolution study lab", each chronicling the achievements of Kim Il-Sung, Kim Jeong-Sook [Kim Il-Sung's wife] and Kim Jong-Il. It will cost a lot of money to construct an additional room for Kim Jong-Un. Even if those rooms are prepared, there is not much to add for Kim Jong-Un because of his youth.

8. When will the first Kim Jong-Un book come out?  There are thousands of books that proclaim the greatness of Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jong-Il, but there is yet no such book about Kim Jong-Un.

9. Will the "Ten Principles" change?  The "Ten Principles for Solidifying the Unitary Ideological System," a statement of governing principles in North Korea, begins with the words "The Great Chairman Comprade Kim Il-Sung." As North Koreans who aspire to be in any important position have to memorize the ten principles word-for-word, the potential change in wording (to include Kim Jong-Il) would be important.

10. Will there be a new song?  Every meeting in North Korea began with singing the songs for Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jong-Il. There is not yet a song for Kim Jong-Un, and it is an open question whether three songs would be required to sung in every meeting also.

Joo also notes that there may be new money with Kim Jong-Il's face printed on it.

The "Apples" of Pyongyang are Trembling
[달러 맛에 흠뻑 취해 호화생활… 평양의 ‘애플족’이 떨고있다] (Dec. 27, 2011)

Joo notes that the children of the high-ranking North Korean officials are called "apples" -- red on the outside, white on the inside -- because despite outwardly being the most dedicated communists, they are in fact the most capitalistic members of North Korea. They are in the position to handle a lot of money through extortion and bribes, and they enjoy luxurious life filled with imported goods. Because they have the most to lose, they fear the collapse of North Korean regime more than anyone else. Since the hold of power is fickle in North Korea, they always have an escape route ready.

The Secret of Pyongyang's Million Mourners
[오늘 김정일 영결식… 평양 ‘통곡의 100만 물결’ 비밀은] (Dec. 28, 2011)

In anticipation of Kim Jong-Il's public funeral, Joo recounts his memory of Kim Il-Sung's funeral. He remembers that the hearse passed him by very quickly. Although he was surrounded by fellow Kim Il-Sung University students, he noticed that few of his fellow students cried. But he believes that for those who cried, the tears were genuine. Joo doubts that the same level of grieving will happen with Kim Jong-Il, and is certain that there will be no tears left for Kim Jong-Un.

Got a question or a comment for the Korean? Email away at askakorean@gmail.com.

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Kim Jong-Il's Death - Summary of Articles by Mr. Joo Seong-Ha

Here is one more introduction for those who have not been acquainted with Mr. Joo Seong-Ha.  Mr. Joo is a former North Korean elite, who attended Kim Il-Sung University and was a professor at the same university. He defected from North Korea in 1996, was captured in China and survived a North Korean gulag. He defected again in 1997, and this time he successfully reached South Korea. Now, he is a journalist for one of the most prestigious newspapers in South Korea. He also writes for his own blog, North Korea Real Talk, which is easily the most visited blog regarding North Korea in all of the Internet. The Korean periodically translated some of Mr. Joo's best articles. You can check out the entire archive of translated articles by Mr. Joo here.

As you might imagine, Mr. Joo has been a busy man since Kim Jong-Il died. Because Mr. Joo write a number of articles and posts since Kim Jong-Il's death, the Korean cannot translate all of them fully. Instead, the Korean will provide a summary of everything Mr. Joo has written so far, both for his newspaper and his blog.

Kim Jong-Il's Death:  Whither Korean Peninsula?
[김정일 사망, 한반도 어디로 가나?] (Dec. 19, 2011)

In the first piece he wrote after the news broke, Mr. Joo briefly noted that the first telltale sign will be the volume of defection. He also noted that there would not be much movement during the official funeral period, and the critical time will be around February or March 2012.

(More after the jump.)

Got a question or a comment for the Korean? Email away at askakorean@gmail.com.



Dark Road Ahead for Post-Kim Jong-Il Era
[포스트 김정일 시대, 앞길은 절망적이다] (Dec. 19, 2011)

Mr. Joo actually wrote this article before Kim Jong-Il died, but he put the article up on the blog because the topic was relevant. In this article, Mr. Joo noted that North Korean regime so far has relied on five pillars:  (1) propaganda and deification; (2) closely knit organization; (3) reign of terror and guilt by association; (4) shutting off and distorting outside information; (5) special favors given to the loyal elite.

However, the massive famine in the early 1990s corroded four of the five pillars, such that the only pillar that is still intact is the reign of terror. Therefore, recently the reign of terror in North Korea has reached a new height. But because the presence of South Korea serves as a constant reminder for North Koreans as to what could have been, the desire to escape would only increase. Especially after Kim Jong-Il dies, Joo argued, North Korea would not be for long.

How North Koreans View Kim Jong-Un
[김정은 보는 북한 주민 심정 비유한다면] (Dec. 20, 2011)

This article is an absolute gem that only Mr. Joo is capable of writing. Upon watching the footages of North Korean people's initial reaction to Kim Jong-Il's death, Joo was shocked by how peaceful Pyongyang looked. This was in marked contrast to Kim Il-Sung's death. When the news of the elder Kim's death broke, ordinary North Koreans dropped to the ground and wailed. Much of the mourning was voluntary. But this time, even in a footage that North Korea must have carefully screened before its release, Mr. Joo only detected one or two people who appeared to be genuinely sad.

How Will the Bankrupt House Survive?
[거덜난 살림 물려주고 어떻게 버티라고] (Dec. 21, 2011)

Mr. Joo notes that the prevailing feeling by North Koreans about Kim Jong-Un is that of resignation. Although people complain of Kim Jong-Un's youth and lack of experience, there is no sign of an organized resistance. But one item of note is that hatred of Kim Jong-Un is spreading within the elite, as Kim Jong-Un has been ruthlessly purging the leadership class.

Mr. Joo points out that the current situation is different from Kim Jong-Il's succession, because, at the time, North Korean economy was still functional, and people supported Kim Il-Sung. As discussed in the previous article, Mr. Joo believes that Kim Jong-Un's only way by which he could manage the current situation is to engage in a reign of terror.

Kim Jong-Un's First Three Days Receives an F
[사흘간 지켜본 김정은 성적표는 '낙제'] (Dec. 22, 2011)

Mr. Joo notes that Kim Jong-Il's funeral would be the first test for Kim Jong-Un, because the funeral is an excellent opportunity for Kim Jong-Un to consolidate his status. When Kim Il-Sung died, Kim Jong-Il engaged in a number of creative policies that consolidated his power. For example, Kim Jong-Il was involved in every last detail of Kim Il-Sung's funeral, abolished the office of the Chairman (such that Kim Il-Sung would be the eternal chairman,) and generally pronounced that he was a filial son who was fit to inherit his father's legacy and rule the country. In contrast, Kim Jong-Un has been simply following the exact procedure that his father implemented when his grandfather died.

The Best Article about Kim Jong-Un's Future
[김정은의 미래를 점친 최고의 명칼럼] (Dec. 23, 2011)

This article is written by Sohn Gwang-Ju, head of the Center for Daily NK Reunification Strategies. Mr. Joo introduced this article by saying that it was the best one among everything he read about Kim Jong-Un in the last few days, and he generally agreed with the article.

In the article, Sohn begins by stating that it is pointless to speculate about whether Kim Jong-Un can succeed smoothly, because the succession is already a done deal. Sohn also points out that China would have a less influence than most people think, because North Korea consistently resisted China's interference in the political arena.

Sohn says Kim Jong-Un only has two choices -- destroy the market that is already in place, or open up the country. But Kim Jong-Un in fact cannot make either choice. Destroying the market would essentially require killing everybody in North Korea. If North Korea is opened up, there is no reason why North Korean people would follow Kim Jong-Un. Sohn then prescribes that South Korea's strategy must be "engagement" and "enlargement," in the areas of information, market, politics and military, in that order. Sohn concludes by castigating the current South Korean administration for getting caught flat footed at the news of Kim Jong-Il's death.

When Will We Hear Kim Jong-Un's Voice?
[김정은 목소리는 언제쯤 들을 수 있을까?] (Dec. 24, 2011)

Mr. Joo writes that Kim Jong-Un's ruling style will likely be similar to his father's ruling style. Just like his father, Kim Jong-Un strengthened his hold over the Security Bureau instead of the military or the Labor Party. Also, Kim Jong-Un's advisors have no experience in having any other kind of ruling style.

Like his father, Kim Jong-Un would likely minimize his exposure to the public. This is in contrast to Kim Il-Sung, who enjoyed being in public.

Will the "Market Generation" Eat Away at Kim Jong-Un Regime?
['장마당 세대' 김정은 체제 갉아먹을까] (Dec. 26, 2011)

Mr. Joo notes that the "Market Generation" -- i.e. North Koreans who were born in 1994, when Kim Il-Sung died -- would enter North Korean society next year, either by getting drafted into the military or advancing to colleges. Mr. Joo writes that North Korea officially recognizes four generations of revolution. The first generation was anti-Japanese fighters who fought alongside Kim Il-Sung; the second was the people who experienced Korean War and the post-war reconstruction; the third was the people who were involved in the Three Communes Movement in the 1970s, and the fourth was the people who underwent the March of Struggles in the 1990s.

The fifth generation does not have an official recognition, but they may be termed as the Market Generation, because the parents of this generation entirely relied on the market to raise them, as they grew up during the mass starvation that was the March of Struggles.

The Market Generation is characterized by a significant depletion of numbers and malnutrition. Compared to the 1980s, North Korea's fertility rate dropped by more than 30 percent. Because of the drop, North Korean military is essentially losing one battalion (= 50,000 soldiers) every year. Also, because of malnutrition, a significant number of these young people are being exempted from conscription. Although North Korean regime has been attempting to address this issue by, for example, drafting more women into the military, it appears inevitable that the military control over North Korea would be weakened simply because there are not enough soldiers.

This generation is also marked by being materialistic, selfish and scornful of organized life. This generation received absolutely nothing from the regime. In fact, schools have been turned into a vehicle for squeezing money out of people. Because of that, over 40 percent of North Korean children do not attend school. Instead, as soon as they are in their teens, they work in the market and earn their own money. Because they are not socialized through school, they do not respect their teachers or any other authority figure. They attempt to get out of serving their military duties by bribing their superiors.

The Market Generation is also wildly enthusiastic about South Korean pop culture. South Korean pop music and dance have spread to every rural corner of North Korea, thanks to the Market Generation. They openly complain that no one in their family is smart enough to defect to South Korea. Having the Market Generation make up the most of North Korean military, therefore, would put further pressure on Kim Jong-Un's regime.

Got a question or a comment for the Korean? Email away at askakorean@gmail.com.

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Merry Christmas

Dear Korean,

Hope you and your wife have been doing well. I just wanted to let you know how much I enjoyed your three-parter with answers to the students from Jangheung High School. I may actually adapt some parts of it for my students. I particularly appreciate your vulnerability in the section about loneliness.

Occasionally I go through a few situations in which I question my decision to move to Seoul. Last week I experienced such a situation. I'll spare you the details except to say that it soured me on Koreans and, for the first time since 2007, I gave some serious consideration to moving back home. Maybe that's why the Jangheung post had such emotional resonance for me.

Anyway, it's not over until it's over. :)

Finals are almost done, and I'll be spending the vacation working on Korean study and continuing education stuff. Then a trip home in February. Your blog's been a big encouragement to me. Have a great Christmas.

Marc H.

The nature of this blog means that great many readers of this blog are non-Korean expats living in Korea. Sometimes, the Korean can be impatient with them, and castigates some of them if he thinks that they are being particularly stupid. But this does not mean that the Korean is blind to the fundamental challenge being faced by expats in Korea:  depending on the day, Korea can be a very unwelcoming place for non-Koreans.

Now, that does not excuse the rants in some expat blogs/message boards that are absolutely nothing more than racist tripe. Neither does that justify the gross distortions of facts about Korea, in an attempt to paint the entire country and people in a negative light. However, without excusing and justifying, the Korean can extend his understanding as to where much of that bile is coming from. For non-Koreans, there will be moments in which their lives in Korea are genuinely shitty, simply because they are not Koreans. And as much time as the Korean spends trying to elucidate the incorrect understanding about Korea, he recognizes that in many cases, a wholesale criticism against Korea is completely fair.

Even when Korea is not being unwelcoming, Korea can be just too different. A large part of our day-to-day lives is not about some great fundamental truths about the universe. It is about a series of habits whose accumulation we have not been even aware of. So, for example, if you are accustomed to a Western-style personal space, you might find it grating to have someone stand next to you a little too close on your everyday commute. Is it a big deal? No. But again, much of life is about small deals. It is the accumulation of those small deals that eventually influence the overall impression of a place.

For some, Christmas is a time where all the negativity about Korea can bubble up. It is another one of those times in which Korea is just too different. Instead of a warm, family-oriented affair, Christmas in Korea is at best a neutered holiday meaningful only to Christians, and at worst a crassly commercialized second Valentine's Day. Of course Koreans have their own warm, family-oriented holidays, but they don't mean that much to non-Korean expats. Instead, facing the assault on senses, it is understandable to feel cold, lonely, and sour about the goddamn place.

Christmas tree at City Hall Square, Seoul
(source)

So here is the Korean's Christmas message for all you expats out there:  stay warm, and get together with friends. Remember that in any place of the world, life as a minority and an immigrant has a potential to be shitty from time to time -- especially if the place does not have a tradition of immigration like Korea. You can read this blog to get a better understanding about why Korea is the way it is, but ultimately, your feelings are yours. Even for a nice person like Marc -- a long time reader whose thoughtfulness is always appreciated -- life in Korea will have shitty moments. Whether or not those moments accumulate to a point where you might consider leaving Korea would be up to you. But in the meantime, stay warm and be with other people. Don't let the annoyance and bile percolate, but be in the spirit of the seasons.

Merry Christmas.

Got a question or a comment for the Korean? Email away at askakorean@gmail.com.

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Kim Jong-Il's Death - The Korean's Thoughts

If you remember where you were when you heard a piece of news, that's a big news. The Korean was reading a newspaper in his living room back in Korea, when he learned from the front page that Kim Il-Sung died. He was on a conference call at work in New York when someone on the call broke the news that Michael Jackson died. And this time, the Korean was walking up the stairs at a hotel near San Luis Obispo, California, when the Korean Wife read her text messages and said, "Hey, Kim Jong-Il died."

The Korean has not been near a computer for quite some time, but he did voraciously read all the news, from within Korea and without. (4G phone = awesome.) Given the significance of the news, the Korean will devote the next several posts over the next several days on North Korea. Specifically, the posts will discuss the Korean's own thoughts, Mr. Joo Seong-Ha's thoughts, things about North Korea that most commentators are missing right now, and any other North Korean question that the Korean has received in the last few days.

*                  *                  *

When the Arab Spring happened, many North Korean observers were eager to extend the analogy to North Korea. In most cases, the analogies failed. North Korea is more isolated, more benighted and more tightly controlled than any of the Arab countries. Even the most repressive Arab dictatorship that fell -- that is, Libya under Qaddafi -- may well be a liberal democracy compared to North Korea.

However, there is one crucial lesson from the Arab Spring that does apply to North Korea. The lesson is this: an apparently stable dictatorship may fall suddenly, unpredictably and uncontrollably. Previous to the Arab Spring, there appeared to be no hope for democracy in Arab nations. For decades, despite constant oppression that appeared intolerable for outside observers, Arab nations persisted in dictatorship. Very smart people -- for example, influential Harvard professor Samuel Huntington -- believed that Islamic cultural traditions prevented Arab nations from having a democracy. And they looked like geniuses, until they did not.

The same applies to North Korea. Freedom's lack of progress in North Korea has frustrated many observers into falsely believing that North Koreans are too brainwashed and the Kim Dynasty too strong. Not so. Looking back, there were many signs that the Arab Spring was imminent -- we just did not know what to look for. Similarly, there are many signs that the fall of North Korea is not far away. You just have to know what to look for. And with Kim Jong-Il's death, there are even more signs that North Korea is not for much longer.

What are those signs? Here are five examples:

1. North Korea is trying out a collective rule for the first time in history.  Throughout its existence, North Korea has always been led by a single ruler. Now, for the first time in its history, North Korea is being ruled by a committee. A rule by committee always contains within it a seed for an internal struggle. The seed is especially likely to germinate if a crucial actor within it -- that is, Kim Jong-Un -- is too inexperienced to maneuver adroitly.
   
   
2. Deification of Kim Jong-Un is not working.  Ever since Kim Jong-Un surfaced into public awareness, the reports from North Korea have been unanimous:  North Korean people do not respect him. Kim Jong-Un was born out of wedlock, by Kim Jong-Il's mistress who was a Korean-Japanese dancer. Kim Jong-Un is only 28 years old. North Koreans quietly deride the attempts at Kim Jong-Un's deification. In fact, failure of charismatic leadership in North Korea began with Kim Jong-Il, who made up for his lack of charisma with political oppression far more brutal than Kim Il-Sung's. At the third generation, the charismatic capital of the Kim family dynasty is now completely empty. Even at the elite level, the relationship between Kim Jong-Un and the elites is transactional rather than personal or ideological.
   
   
3. Vast majority of North Koreans does not depend on the regime for their livelihood.  Since the 1990s, North Korea has ceased to be a communist economy with collective production and distribution. Instead, as far as economy is concerned, North Korea is deeply capitalistic. People's livelihood depends on the market, not on the rations handed by the Labor Party. Kim Jong-Il regime correctly saw this, and attempted to reverse this trend by closing the markets and engaging in a currency reform. The currency reform was an unmitigated disaster, and the markets reopened in just three months. At this point, North Korea can never return to being a communist economy. And greater the market forces are, the weaker the forces of the regime.
   
   
4. North Korea is more porous than ever.  It is, of course, true that North Korea is severely isolated. But the isolation must not be overstated. Because of the factor (3) above, North Korea now has a group of people at the top of the economic ladder who actually enjoy a semi-decent living standards. There are more than 800,000 cell phones operating in North Korea now, and that is before we begin counting the Chinese phones in North Korea that can be used to call South Korea directly. Young people in Pyongyang openly flaunt their iPads. South Korean pop culture, which has captured the imagination of the world, has also hit North Korea. The pirated DVD sets of the latest Korean dramas are widely available in North Korea. Further, there are more North Korean defectors than ever living in South Korea -- 20,000 of them, representing practically every major city in North Korea. Because border patrols can be easily bribed, these defectors regularly communicate with the families back in North Korea via telephone or letters. All this means that ordinary North Koreans have absolutely no illusions about the failure of their own country to provide for them.
   
   
5. North Korean economy is weaker than ever.  The price of rice in North Korea nearly doubled in the last two years, although there is no indication that the living standards in North Korea improved twofold as well. Although rice is harvested in autumn, the price has not fallen in the recent months. Last time this happened in the 1990s, North Korea went through a mass starvation in which a million people starved to death. North Koreans remember this, and likely will not wait to starve this time.

All of these examples point to the fundamental existential dilemma for North Korea -- if the regime lets the status quo continue, the rot of capitalistic corruptibility will reach all the way to the top of the regime and mass starvation may happen again. The regime already saw that it could not revert to the command-and-control economy. But opening up North Korea would lead to the collapse and destruction of the regime. Kim Jong-Un has no way out of this trap. North Korea will collapse; it is just a matter of when and how.

Got a question or a comment for the Korean? Email away at askakorean@gmail.com.

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Still Traveling, Sorry

Sorry folks, the Korean is back in California with his family and still traveling around Santa Barbara wine country. He will be back with his reaction re: Kim Jong-Il's death and other topics in a couple of days.

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Kim Jong-Il is dead

the korean is traveling and cannot say much right now except he will be celebrating tonight. have your say in the meantime .

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1000th Wednesday Protest, and Lies about Comfort Women by Imperial Japan Apologists

As the Korean discussed previously, there was the 1000th Wednesday Protest in front of the Japanese embassy in Seoul this past Wednesday. At the protest, there was an unveiling of a statue, commemorating the Comfort Women.

The statue is a statue of a girl sitting down. There is an empty chair next to the girl,
so that visitors may sit next to her and look toward the Japanese Embassy. There is
also a plaque, in Korean, English and Japanese, that describe the significance of the statue
(source)

True to form, the Japanese Embassy protested the statue, stating that the statue was "extremely regrettable," and asked it to be removed. Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied: "Rather than insisting on the removal of the statue, the Japanese government should seriously ask itself why these victims have held their weekly rallies for 20 years, never missing a week, and whether it really cannot find a way to restore the honor these woman so earnestly want.”

On this occasion, the Korean will address some of the lies and half-truths that Japan apologists propagate, commonly found in prominent sites like Japan Probe and picked up by careless observers like the BBC. In particular, this post will focus on the apologies and reparations aspect, rather than the facts about Comfort Women themselves.

[Addendum, 12/16/2011:  There are additional arguments commonly made by Japan apologists other than the ones listed below, but those arguments are so intellectually worthless that they do not merit a lengthy discussion. Such arguments include:  outright denial of established facts ("There is no evidence that Japanese government coerced these women"); tu quoque ("Korea committed atrocities in Vietnam"); false moral equivalence ("Allied forces also committed atrocities during World War II"); distraction with tenuously related items ("Prostitutes in Korea are treated badly also."). If you want to argue against this piece, please stay away from those types of arguments. It is one thing to be morally depraved by arguing for Japan's position; it is quite another to be morally depraved and stupid.]

1.  Japan already apologized for Comfort Women.

This statement is only technically true, in a sense that the Japanese government mouthed the words of apology. For example, in 1993, in Kono Statement, Japanese government acknowledged that Imperial Japanese military was directly and indirectly involved in recruiting Comfort Women through coercion and trickery. There are several other cases in which Japanese Prime Ministers issued an apology regarding Comfort Women.

However, the point of an apology is to show a genuine change of heart and contrition. An apology is not a license for one to turn around and spit in the face of the person to whom the apology was just issued. An apology is not a credit in the moral bank account, so that one can later make a withdrawal and commit more immoral deeds. Simply mouthing the words and going through the motions are clearly inadequate for anyone with a functional moral compass. In that sense, there are several of reasons to consider the Japanese apologies to be inadequate:

a.  Each apology was carefully worded to avoid any legal liability

If you did something bad, you should be ready to accept all consequences, moral and legal. You have to say the right thing and do the right thing also. If you say the right things but fail to do the right things, the words are meaningless and hollow. That is how each one of Japan's apologies on Comfort Women has been structured. Reading carefully, most of the apologies usually say:  "We are sorry this bad thing happened to you," without discussing that it was the Imperial Japan that caused that bad thing. Each one of Japan's apologies regarding Comfort Women was designed for Japan to evade legal responsibility while attempting to absolve its moral responsibility. But morality does not work that way. Even a child would know this.

b.  Subsequent Japanese administrations sought to whitewash the Comfort Women issue

Japan's apologies -- particularly those made in the 1990s, which had greater specificity about its direct responsibility -- was not a result of a nationwide reflection and contrition by Japan. It was issued by an unusually liberal Japanese government, which had a tenuous hold on power. When the conservative block of the Liberal Democratic Party came back in power, the Japanese government quickly displayed the insincerity of its stance on the Comfort Women issue.

In 2007, a group of 120 LDP members sought to water down Kono Statement. Nakayama Nariaki, the leader of that group, said: "Some say it is useful to compare the brothels to college cafeterias run by private companies, who recruit their own staff, procure foodstuffs and set prices."

Also in 2007, LDP Prime Minister Abe Shinzo (a grandson of a man suspected to be a class-A war criminal, Kishi Nobusuke,) denied that the Imperial Japanese military recruited Comfort Women. Abe only backed off after a stern warning from the U.S. ambassador. Another former Prime Minister, Nakasone Yasuhiro, also denied that the Comfort Women were forcibly recruited. Further, former education minister Nariaki Nakayama declared he was proud that the LDP had succeeded in getting references to "wartime sex slaves" struck from most authorized history texts for junior high schools. Nakayama further said: "It could be said that the occupation was something they could have pride in, given their existence soothed distraught feelings of men in the battlefield and provided a certain respite and order."

(Take a break here, let that last statement sink in for a bit, and appreciate the level of depravity required to make that statement.)

Again, back to the overriding point:  an apology is meaningless when it is mere words mouthed as a formality. Because the subsequent leaders of the Japanese government were ready to go back on its stance on Comfort Women just as soon as the administration changed, there are real reasons to doubt the sincerity of Japan's contrition over Comfort Women.

(More after the jump.)

Got a question or a comment for the Korean? Email away at askakorean@gmail.com.



2.  Japan offered reparation for Comfort Women in 1995, but Comfort Women are refusing to accept it.

Two years after Kono Statement, Japanese government established "Asia Women's Fund" to provide compensation for Comfort Women. However, AWF was funded by private donations rather than governmental funding, again in an attempt to shield the Japanese government from legal liability.

Like Kono Statement and other apologies by the Japanese government, the offer from AWF was morally deficient. Accordingly, most Comfort Women refused the payment.

3.  Japan already paid reparation for Comfort Women in 1965, but Korean government diverted the funds.

In 1965, Korea and Japan entered into Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea, under which Korean government relinquished individual claims of reparation in exchange of a lump sum payment of $800 million in grants and soft loans. Korean government used the money to fund infrastructure projects, such as a highway between Seoul and Busan. Based on this treaty, Japan apologists argue that the fault lies with Korean government for compensating the Comfort Women. This argument is incorrect, both morally and legally, for the following reasons:

a.  Japan knowingly dealt with a dictator who clearly did not represent the interest of Korean people

Park Chung-Hee was the president who entered into the Basic Treaty with Japan, which makes the legitimacy of the Basic Treaty doubtful in a number of ways. First, Park Chung-Hee was not a democratically elected leader, but a dictator who came to power through a military coup d'etat. Although Park went through the formality of elections, those elections were clearly and heavily rigged. Second, previous to Korea's independence, Park was an officer of the Imperial Japanese military. (Gee, I wonder what he felt about Imperial Japan's war?) Third, when the news of the Basic Treaty broke, there was so much protest against the treaty that the Park dictatorship had to declare a martial law to suppress the opposition. Under the martial law, all schools were closed, citizens were banned from holding meetings, arrests were made without warrants and the government pre-screened newspapers.

Every one of these facts were known to the Japanese government, but the Japanese government dealt with the Park Chung-Hee dictatorship anyway and entered into a treaty that was clearly inadequate to address the injuries suffered at the hands of Japanese Imperialism. (More on this below.)

b.  The reparation amount paid by Japan was grossly inadequate

The amount of $800 million was calculated by paying $200 per survivors of the Japanese conscription and $2000 per those who were injured. In 2011 dollars, that's less than $1,500 and $15,000 per person. A dead dog is worth more than $1,500 in either Japanese or Korean legal system. By the way, Germany pays Holocaust survivors a lifetime pension.

c.  Korean government, in fact, paid out the reparation paid by Japan

It is ridiculous to argue that the fault lies with Korean government, given that the Japanese government could not have possibly expected that the money would go to the hands of the people who suffered under its rule by negotiating a dictator who came to power illegitimately.

But be that as it may, Korean government did pay out the reparation money and then some. In 1975, a decade after the Basic Treaty, Park Chung-Hee dictatorship paid out KRW 300,000 (= around $300) to those eligible for reparation. (At this time, however, Comfort Women were not paid reparation because their existence was not widely known.) After Korea democratized, Korean government paid out KRW 20 million (= around $20,000) to those eligible for reparation in 2006. The amount of reparation, by the way, is much more than what Japan paid as reparation (which, again, was around $1,500 in 2011 dollars.) Former Comfort Women also receive a separate pension from Korean government, far above and beyond anything that Japan has ever provided.

d.  Basic Treaty did not eliminate Comfort Women's claims

Even if we brush aside the monstrously amoral aspect to Japan's position and only concerned ourselves with its legality, Japan's position is on thin ice.

First, internal Japanese documents around the time of the negotiations of the Basic Treaty show that Japan did not intend to extinguish individual claims by entering into the Basic Treaty. Referring to the provision that allegedly waived Korean individuals' right of claim, an internal memorandum from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs states:

"By Art. 2 [of the Basic Treaty], parties agree that they will not exercise the right of diplomatic protection, which is a unique right belonging to the state under the international law; it is not the case that individual’s property [which includes claims] was used to satisfy the obligations of the state."

Second, even if the Basic Treaty did attempt to eliminate Comfort Women's claim for reparation, well-established principles of international law say that such attempt is invalid. Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: "Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law." Article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights likewise states: "Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes . . . [t]o ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy." Because Japan's reparation has been grossly inadequate under the Basic Treaty, Comfort Women were denied of an "effective remedy" guaranteed by established principles of international law.

Another established principle of international law is even more directly on point.  Sub-Commission resolution 1999/16 from UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, titled “Systematic rape, sexual slavery and slavery-like practices”, states at Paragraph 13:

The Sub-Commission . . . [n]otes that the rights and obligations of States and individuals with respect to the violations referred to in the present resolution cannot, as a matter of international law, be extinguished by peace treaty, peace agreement, amnesty or by any other means.

Therefore, even speaking legally, Japanese government cannot argue that the Basic Treaty absolves them from all liabilities to the Comfort Women.

4.  There is nothing Japan can do to satisfy Koreans about Imperial Japan's legacy.

This is simply not true. There are only 63 surviving Comfort Women left. Logistically, it is not difficult at all for the Japanese Prime Minister to pay each one of them a visit, hand-deliver a sincere letter of apology, and vow to provide them with a lifetime pension, identify and punish any surviving Japanese who was responsible, fund a museum and a scholarship dedicated to chronicling the ordeals that they went through, and ensure that Japan's history textbooks accurately depict what happened. The cost of doing this for Japan is minimal. The only thing holding back Japan is the lack of political will. Once these things are done, there is no possible way in which any Korean can protest about the way Japan treats former Comfort Women.

(For a broad action plan with which Japan could finally deal with its colonial legacy once and for all, please refer to this post.)

The Korean would emphasize that this is not "punishing the child for the sins of the parents," as Japan apologists mistakenly argue. No one -- not even the most nationalistic Korean -- is saying that the current generation of Japanese people should be punished as if they themselves committed this horrendous crime. (If there were the case, Koreans would be calling for every Japanese people to be put in jail for life. Obviously, such movement does not exist in Korea.) All Koreans want is for (1) Japanese government to unequivocally admit what its country did in the past; (2) former Comfort Women to be adequately compensated in their short remaining lives, and; (3) Japanese people to fully understand the crimes of its predecessors. None of the above is a punishment. Rather, it is a normal course of action that any decent human would take. In fact, it is the least Japan can do. The battle here is not Japan versus Korea -- it is Japan versus justice, Japan versus human decency.

That Japan is obstinately refusing to take this course is deeply troubling, because I love Japan. The greatest influences of my life include Japanese movies and cartoons. I love visiting Japan. I love Japanese food. The Japanese people I know are wonderful, kind, artistic, gritty and civic-minded people, worthy of deep admiration. But the longer this takes, I cannot draw myself away from this appalling conclusion:  Japan, as a whole, does not think it did anything wrong to these women. I desperately want to believe that the Japanese people are not amoral monsters, who would rather play the cynical waiting game until all of the former Comfort Women die away. But each time the Wednesday protesters are turned away, each time the Japanese Embassy protests a statue commemorating the Comfort women, my faith in human decency, common among all people of all places and times, gets chipped away little by little.

Got a question or a comment for the Korean? Email away at askakorean@gmail.com.

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